Walter:
or the switch was moved by persons unknown on the ground soon after the crash (as smoke marks suggest).
OK Walter, that's a Red Card for you! You know full well that the "Smoke Marks", ie sooting, suggested (as stated by Mr Cable, AAIB Inspector) quite the opposite, that the switch was selected to, and gated at, OFF prior to the crash. It is only you that suggests that the switch was ON at impact but switched OFF by your angst ridden Seal before fire spread to that region of the wreckage!
As to the paper trail/airworthiness stuff, I honestly don't know what you mean, I really don't! The aircraft was unairworthy because the HC2 had crap code in the FADEC, a flying control system with a history of UFCM's, and not a single avionics system available for anything other than "switch on" use only, rather than an absence of paper. There was paper work all right, in the guise of a Release to Service signed by the Controller Aircraft and the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff. I mean, that must mean its kosher, mustn't it? Or must it? It wasn't lack of paper that was the problem Walter, rather that what paper there was lied like a cheap Changi watch!