Dozy, the BEA seems to have had extensive conversations with the crews of the other three flights (Lufthansa, Iberia, and AF459).
The first interim report had this to say about AF459's use of radar. (AF459 was 35 minutes behind at 350)
After flying through a turbulent zone in the head of a cumulus congestus formation at the level of NATAL, without having detected this zone on the radar, he selected gain in MAX mode. At about 2 h 00, he observed a first echo that differed significantly depending on whether the radar’s gain was in CAL or MAX mode. The TILT was set between -1° and 1.5° ....the screen, which was set to a scale of 160 NM. The echoes were yellow and red when the radar was set with gain on the MAX position and green and yellow when the gain was on the CAL position
Lufthansa (20 minutes ahead at 325, (FL based on AMDAR trace))
The crew reported that it flew at the upper limit of the cloud layer and then in the clouds in the region of ORARO. In this zone they saw green echoes on the radar on their path, which they avoided by changing their route
Iberia (12 minutes behind at 370), the BEA report does not mention their use of radar.
These conditions were particularly severe 70 NM to 30 NM before the TASIL waypoint. They moved away from the route by about 30 NM to the east to avoid cumulonimbus formations with a significant vertical development, and then returned to the airway in clear skies close to the
TASIL waypoint.
As for AF459, same model airplane, presumably same radar system, similar flight crew training, and also had presumably received a similar message from dispatch re: satellite observation of Cbs vicinity ORARO-TASIL. (AF459 departed approximately same time as AF447, but from further south.) Did the captain of AF459 take a rest at the typical time? Did AF459 change comm frequency away from ATLANTICO immediately after a SELCAL check? Comparisons of behavior between the two crews could be quite enlightening.
Even in the absence of a full CVR, inferences can start to be drawn regarding the situational awareness of the AF447 flight crew, before and during.
In its brief note, the BEA did not mention any crew conversation about the radar setting. If they had changed the mode and discussed it, would not the BEA have mentioned such? The BEA does note that the flight crew notified the cabin crew that they would be going through an area of turbulence, but no indication of any specific instructions to the cabin crew to be seated, stop service, etc. The BEA does not note any attempt by the crew to communicate with ATLANTICO or DAKAR about its circumstances, even though it had looped in its heading. (If IB6024 had not deviated, it would be only eight minutes behind at the climactic point.)
My own feeling is that if there was exculpatory conversation on the CVR, the BEA would have referenced such in its brief note.