Originally Posted by Graybeard
Was the PNF possibly too busy/engrossed/distracted with pages of ECAM warnings and alerts to notice what the plane was doing?
Or consider something simple like Pavlovian conditioning. Mr. Optimistic gets this point in message
69 thread 4.
Originally Posted by BEA
From 2 h 10 min 05, the autopilot then auto-thrust disengaged and the PF said "I have the controls". The airplane began to roll to the right and the PF made a left nose-up input. The stall warning sounded twice in a row.
The order is not clear. But the pilot did give a NU command. And as the plane answered the command the stall warning STOPPED. The pilot was rewarded for the NU command.
Originally Posted by BEA
At 2 h 10 min 16 The airplane’s pitch attitude increased progressively beyond 10 degrees and the plane started to climb. The PF made nose-down control inputs and alternately left and right roll inputs. The vertical speed, which had reached 7,000 ft/min, dropped to 700 ft/min and the roll varied between 12 degrees right and 10 degrees left. The speed displayed on the left side increased sharply to 215 kt (Mach 0.68). The airplane was then at an altitude of about 37,500 ft and the recorded angle of attack was around 4 degrees
The pilot made a nose down input.
Originally Posted by BEA
At 2 h 10 min 51 , the stall warning was triggered again.
The pilot was spanked for that nose down input. After the first "reward" the pilot repeated the "rewarded" move, NU.
Originally Posted by BEA
At around 2 h 11 min 40 ... During the following seconds,
all of the recorded speeds became invalid and the stall warning stopped.
The pilot was again "rewarded" for NU commands.
Originally Posted by BEA
...The altitude was then about 35,000 ft, the angle of attack exceeded 40 degrees and the vertical speed was about -10,000 ft/min. The airplane’s pitch attitude did not exceed 15 degrees and the engines’ N1’s were close to 100%. The airplane was subject to roll oscillations that sometimes reached 40 degrees. The PF made an input on the sidestick to the left and nose-up stops, which lasted about 30 seconds.
By now the PF was "conditioned". He was rewarded for NU and punished for ND.
The plane turned the stall warning OFF when it had no good reason to do so. So what's this nonsense BEA has been spouting that the plane is not at fault? The plane has a critical design flaw in its software that conditions pilots to do the wrong thing even when they know better.
In the past four days worth of posts on catch-up reading I've seen nothing to change my view in this regard.