Originally Posted by
infrequentflyer789
To me, some of the scariest comments on these threads have been on training practices. Was PFs only training for stall warning "pull up" (to minimize alt loss) ? That is all it would take.
The training practices may need some new scenarii but none of the past Pitot incidents (with the same pattern) analyzed in the BEA interim report n°2 showed such a crew reaction (maintained NU inputs), some of them did not identify the "unreliable IAS" situation, some of them chose not to react to the stall alarms, some of them put their A/C in descent, etc... the persistent NU inputs of the PF are one thing, but there are two pilots (and 3 a bit later) in the cockpit: the PNF did not stop this critical high altitude sequence (pitch & AoA skyrocket)(the BEA says he has been trying several times to get the CPT back to the cockpit), and the CPT did not recover it (even if there was ND inputs which reduced the AoA).
The recent BEA note is so coarse, there are huge gaps in the chronology, we have been given a limited set of new facts, and it raises so many questions. Hopefully in one month, the BEA will have fully released its findings, and we will have all the time plots of all the flight parameters (and automation states), crew inputs, a more detailed review of the CVR content, of the procedures implemented (or not), maybe a numerical simulation of the stall,... many new facts, and maybe unanswered questions. Note that AF and Airbus have not been waiting for the BEA findings to alter the stall procedure or prohibit the emergency maneuver (memory items CLB/5°) in cruise phase.