syseng68k,
Presumably a tail-chute could be fitted, perhaps to a strengthened APU bulkhead. How its getting tangled-up with the APU (which might be running) could be prevented, I'm not sure.
Other problems
(1) It would have to be certificated for public transport, and presumably deployed on a test-flight.
(2) Would it be deployed automatically or manually (by crew action), and what criteria would be used?
(3) Would it subsequently be jettisoned automatically or manually (by crew action), and what criteria would be used?
(4) In the event of jettison failure, which might have followed unwanted deployment, would the aircraft be capable of maintaining level flight? (The second prototype BAC 1-11 had to make a very sudden forced landing on Salisbury Plain when it suffered this problem during deep-stall testing,)
Hard cases make bad law?
Re the uncommanded roll to the right as the AP disconnected, the BEA does not quantify it. Turbulence?
Like some others, I have a feeling that the PF may have experienced some difficulty in achieving left-stick without up-stick when unexpectedly handed the baby at 4am CET. I also hang on to the faint hope that the BEA may acquire ASI 2 data from the QAR. Unless it was over-reading, I cannot understand why he perpetuated the mistake as the aircraft climbed.