Squidlord
Perhaps inadvertently wrongly expressed but this is definitely not the answer. The MAA is a regulator and the very last thing you want is to remove responsibility for safety away from the operator to the regulator. See Cullen, Robens, reports, etc. for how previous safety cultures involved a lack of responsibility for safety on the part of operators because they believed their (only) safety responsibility was to satisfy the regulator, standards, etc. Regulators obviously bear some responsibility for safety but primary responsibility must reside with operators.
I understand exactly what you are saying. In my experience, the practical problem came when addressing the concept of "Safety is everyone's concern". If you dared report a safety problem, especially in the late 80s, throughout the 90s and into the 00s, then you risked your career.
The MoD(PE) / DPA 2 Star in charge of (e.g.) Chinook and Nimrod is on record (1998) as stating that we (engineering project managers) can completely ignore functional safety, going so far as to specifically rule one can (and should) make a false declaration that such a contractual obligation has been met in full, when in fact it had been waived to save time and money. Our 4 Star, CDP, agreed in writing as have 5 Ministers for the Armed Forces and PUS. These rulings reflected those of the staffs of the RAF Chief Engineer made in the early 90s.
Given that background, little wonder MoD don't like "going there". Too many of those involved still hold senior posts at AbbeyWood. As ever, matters will improve when they leave and their replacements can order an about turn without fear or censure. To this end, Haddon-Cave but scraped the surface. It is the "ART" reports of the early/mid 90s which reveal the detail he, for whatever reason, chose not to report. They make appalling reading. You are right; they should be held electronically and every member of every PT should have copies and have the content ingrained in their memory.