syseng68k
You mention a very important part of the puzzle. At the critical time of a/p drop, the PF had a sensorial challenge. I believe he read the panel and made corrections consistent with his overall and immediate assessment. If the a/c is in ROLL Direct, but with Trimming Pitch, his ability with the ailerons will need to be immediately adjusted to inputs with Elevator.
The pic supplied by Machaca of the engineer on the ladder working on the RCU shows the massive HS and its actuator jack screw. A/C operate in three planes, and when one starts reacting substantially differently when it still needs to be used in co-ordination with the others can cause that focus you note.
you say:
"...Note: "reduced stability requirements". This implies that when
the systems gives up, the aircraft will be more difficult to control
manually, than a non fbw aircraft. I think someone already mentioned
elsewhere that the a/c would be very sensitive to control inputs..."
How often did the pilots train to the discrepancy in "touch" to Roll compared with Pitch? How necessary was the Rudder, if at all, to settle the Yaw produced by Roll excursion? I believe firmly the accident began at loss of a/p, and the corrections input by PF. It is very easy to entertain getting a bit behind, which makes it not difficult to question whether they caught up, and if not, perhaps the a/c and Pilots started down different paths? In a general way, I think this will be the fulcrum of the findings.
Reading the A320 thread (Unreliable Air Speed Flaw), there simply seems to be an uncomfortable lack of understanding between crew and a/c in off normal regimes.
Lonewolf Re: Boyd. Coram makes mention of very high drag in ACM, in his biography, which has an excellent Index.
Are you sure aircrews should study OODA? With patience and calm being part of the Air Bus check list, how will you fold AGILITY into the Loop?