DV
NSG have adopted their own up-to-date procedures to replace redundant techniques from APs.
This is the laughable bit. Who is the common denominator? ACAS, as he must sign an RTS stating what APs are authorised. In making this declaration, he is saying he’s satisfied there is an audit trail back through validation and verification.
But, instead of demanding the regulations be followed (existing APs made good) he apparently allows NSG to make their own documents up. I wonder if they were validated and verified properly? If not, this compounds the problem. Better, simpler, cheaper and quicker to implement the regs in the first place.
But, throughout the late 80s and 90s (at least) ACAS was in the position that if he insisted on his aircraft being airworthy, then he was challenging stated policies (e.g. that safety should be sacrificed to save money). But that’s what 2 Stars are paid for. Isn’t it? No chance. It was left to civilian project managers to make these challenges. The Chief Engineer’s immediate subordinate promptly ruled this a disciplinary offence (3 months after publication of CHART). That’s the kind of response we came to expect from these people. I don’t imagine IFS was impressed either.
For anyone wondering why we're mentioning other aircraft, this is one component of airworthiness that was centralised at the time. That is, if one aircraft was affected, almost certainly all were, to a greater or lesser extent. Hence, systemic failings.