Svarin,
You asked: These faults are unrelated : wiring + icing. How can this be ?
Has this strangest of dual failures ever been foreseen ?
How can one expect the design to operate as advertised in this likely un-designed for situation ?
Does anyone have reliable information as to the exact state of PRIM2 operation after this combination of faults ?
How can anyone be certain that PRIM2 did indeed latch Alternate 2 Law ?
How can one be sure it did compute identical to PRIM1 & PRIM3 when it is obvious its state is different ?
What happens if PRIMs differ in their assessment of the outlier ADR ?
What happens if, after their 10 seconds ADR cross-checking "window", PRIMs end up in different states, deciding on different flight laws ?
Has anyone considered what could happen to PRIM2 if it lost datalink with ADR1 at the very moment when the PRIMs tried to eliminate the outlier ADR ?
The accident investigation of "hardware based" a/c involves dealing with facts "recorded' in wreckage, site evidences, recorders (if available), forensic analysis of victims, etc.
The answer of your (above) questions depends "working" with resources and data we donīt have.
In this case, with a highly complex a/c, with a chain of events triggered by analog parameters (individually recorded?), the info on RH not recorded, and an intriguing coincidence (icing+wiring issue), unfortunately
i can only reply with more questions:
1) The recorded data (FDR) could be sufficient to simulate and understand what could happened (with same configīs, software versions, etc)
2) Could BEA operate properly, considering only Airbus SAS has all (most) expertise to understand all (most) issues involving itīs complex product and probable behavior under such circonstances?
3) Are recorded parameters (FDR) enough to analyze and understand all important facts (possible intermitent failures, glitches, etc.)
What concerns me is:
The crew actions and responses are fully recorded and can be used to identify responsabilities.
The "System" working could be analyzed and understood (simulating similar inputs, etc) based in available recorded data? There are other recorded data that could be used in the BEA investigation?
Or we may enter (due the complexity of the a/c System) in a situation to never understand completely what happened at that critical moments (7,000 fpm climb, NU inputs, etc)?
In summary: The recorded data (FDR) is sufficient to fully characterize System responsibilities in this specific case?
My question is because i donīt know if available recorded data could be sufficient to fully analyze the working of a complex "finite states machine" (with this responsibility in Airbus SAS planes design)
And, are current FDR compatible to "advanced planes" using Systems with increasing responsibility? Current FDR are capable to allow a full understanding of what really happens in the Systems? And at what level?