Hard to believe that "More is better" is still around....
In respect to FBW, Airbus SAS philosophy and computers with itīs intrinsic complexity (software testability issues, etc.) the redundancy implemented is mandatory for itīs advanced planes.
The use of the 3 Pitotīs (identical) subject to the same problem (recorded in many other similar cases) being scanned by the System and "capable to trigger" a major a/c change makes me concerned.
I think this is a point (before better available Pitotīs) to be reviewed.
Sounds like System Designers used the idea of Redundancy in an almost "wrong sense".
In summary: To scan and process an information of this magnitude of importance and "switch laws" based on multiple "non reliable sensors" does not seem to me a safe approach. Better perhaps to "warn only" and present the separate info to the 3 crew (LH, RH and ISIS).
During "short period Pitot failures" this could be adequate.
And i insist, Pitotīs problems for this new advanced planes deserves immediate attention and this not seems to me a technological problem. IMO itīs just a product (specs, cert. etc) issue. Not critical in other less "advanced" a/c.