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Old 11th June 2011 | 09:26
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Hyperveloce
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Joined: Jun 2009
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From: in a plasma cocoon
Originally Posted by Sciolistes
Bearfoil,
Isn't that the whole problem with that damn stupid report. Essentially hundreds of pages of posts that still haven't actually understood what that repoort is actually reporting. Why such a vague description of the events? What nonesense is this
It was a note (not a report, to be published before the end of july) released under the pressure of leaks, speculations, and of Airbus (which wanted the preliminary data to be published before the Bourget air show). Even if uncomplete, we now know who was the PF/PNF in the cockpit, what were the crew reactions, and how the A/C stalled. Now we have to understand why these multiple NU inputs in the presence of stall warnings (in many of the past Pitot incidents with early stall warnings, ND inputs put the A/C in descent. None of the crew attempted to set a CLB/5°). Here:

-In a first sequence (from the Pitot signature at 2 h 10 min 05 to 2 h 10 min 50), the A/C climbed very rapidly to FL 375 but was not yet stalled (AoA~4°). Whether this climb was voluntary or not is not clear, even if the PF expressed regrets during the brieffing for not being able to climb due to the temperature profile, there were NU inputs as soon as the PF got the controls, even before the 1st stall alarms, then ND orders to stabilize the trajectory at the FL 375.

-The following 50 sec sequence between 2 h 10 min 50 and 2 h 11 min 40 (CPT reentered the cockpit), beginning with stall warnings, and then TO/GA + maintained NU inputs, effectivelly stalled the A/C (AoA=pitch=16° @ FL380). I am puzzled by these maintained NU orders by the PF (~800 hrs on A330 type) when stall warnings sounded for the 2nd time, but even more by the fact that the PNF (~4500 hrs on A330 type) did not react to the increasing pitch 2.5°->4°->10°->16° at such a flight level (over FL 375), leading to the stall. The BEA note says that during this phase the PNF tried several times to call the Captain back into the cockpit: was his attention devoted to help aviate/navigate or to communicate with the cabin crew ?

Last edited by Hyperveloce; 11th June 2011 at 09:43. Reason: correcting my poor english
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