Squidlord
Even though you challenge a statement I made, I agree entirely with your post. The difference is that I look at it from a perspective of attaining airworthiness in the first place, whereas I think many here (e.g. aircrew) only see a small part of the maintaining airworthiness process. That is not a criticism; in the same way I cannot begin to imagine what they think and how they go about their job. I think most aircrew would agree that they assume the aircraft is airworthy if it arrives at the squadron door and they are told to fly it. They rely entirely on everyone before them in the chain having done their job properly. But when was that ever enforced in MoD?
Thus, when I talk about “understanding” I mean that in the sense that technology and system integration maturity must be demonstrated to defined levels before approval can be granted to (a) enter development and (b) production. If you don’t achieve that understanding at each stage, then the question of signing an airworthiness statement doesn’t even arise. May I suggest this process is largely invisible to most on this forum. (Thank God say all).
A system such as Safety Critical Software > DECU > FADEC > Chinook cannot be said to be mature if there are hundreds of anomalies in the SCS and the possible effects are not understood. If you do not understand, then how can you implement a Limitations based Release to Service? That is what Boscombe were saying when they recommended a re-write and refused to make a recommendation that the Mk2 be released to service. (A recommendation that the RTS ignores). For a system of “lesser” criticality, one may accept some higher degree of risk, but not for SCS. But even then, if you haven’t demonstrated the required maturity, you simply don’t get approval to proceed to the next stage. This is mandated, but very poorly implemented. A Chinook 2 Star in MoD(PE) / DPA is on record as saying this entire process (e.g. Design Reviews) may be waived to save money.
So, from that perspective, the lack of understanding is one reason why the aircraft could not be declared airworthy. As I said, Boscombe’s position made it unlikely there was a valid Certificate of Design, which the regulations state precludes fitting to an aircraft. If you can’t fit it, as you rightly say, you can’t demonstrate compliance at that stage.
What reveals this lack of maturity in a way everyone here can understand is that there was no Full or Limited clearance for any Nav or Comms system on 2.6.94.
This fact was withheld from aircrew and MoD lied about it when asked by MoD Legal Services before the FAI. If you haven’t got clearance to rely on ANY Nav system, then my instinct tells me flight in IMC is out of the question. And that gets to the nub of MoD’s case.