Mmmm ...
I have to agree with both Geoffers and Epiphany on this .... the history of aviation is beset with all sorts of incidents that have happened to crews ...
But second guessing the RFM (or company check list) 'cos you know better than the guy that wrote it is sheer folly.
You get (very well) paid to fly the aircraft the way the company wants you to fly it ... that invariably is IAW with company SOPs which usually means the IAW the RFM and its advice ...
Sometimes that SOP causes issues that require a modification to said SOP and that is usually done by someone on a much higher paygrade than moi ... and who will then be 'in the frame' when it all turns to '****e'.
An example from my experience was the B222UT which I at one stage I flew offshore ... this little sucker had the float arm switch on the LH overhead panel right next to the No1 engine (electrical) fuel shut off valve .... yup you can guess the excitement this caused when the WRONG switch was activated on short finals and the No1 engine died instead of the floats being armed ... happily after a few incidents (which I believe did not cause any accidents?) this switch was moved and the issued resolved. That was a BAD ergonomics choice by those 'good ol boys' at Bell Helicopter.
Thus far the 139 has not to my knowledge suffered a floatation related failure and so I am happy to stick to the RFM suggestions ... I do of course reserve the right to change my mind if presented with a convincing argument to do so.
