2. Someone please assure me the logic is sane enough NOT to inhibit the stall warning at any IAS in the event of AIRSPEED UNRELIABLE?!
First of all, AIRSPEED UNRELIABLE may only be, indeed probably is, "crew assessed"
not aircraft (if the aircraft assesses it it will "deal" with it).
Next, even if the crew do assess it, they do not, and cannot "tell" the aircraft.
So now we have a stall warning, driven by a airflow "vane". When would you like the stall warning to go off? Even at airspeeds below which the vane can work?? These vanes are substantial pieces of metal that can withstand the best part of 500K/1.0M. They are not little feathers that will read reliably at 20K IAS
Your post expresses indignation at a warning that was not present, when maybe it should have been. The designers also have to consider not presenting warnings when they are not valid - indeed "Stall" is one of the highest level wanrings in the Airbus, and the consequence of an incorrectly presented one is potentially very hazardous.
The airframe / software designers have to work to some parameters. Knocking off AoA interpretation below 60K IAS seems valid enough to me - and also at that sort of airspeed you are not just "stalled" in the normal sense of the word - you are a falling leaf. I cannot see elevators having any effect at 50KIAS. The idea of the Stall Warning, and recovery actions, is to never get anywhere near that situation.
I am not relating the above to the accident as much as we know it, just the facts in the posts above.