What you are suggesting is an interconnection with both SS (Bus bar or by Electric synchronisation) and in abnormal situations you want to disconnect this synch.
A lot of engineering ahead for a feature which will be of -no use- most of the time.
The same could be said for Stall Warning and a lot of other basic items that are required by regulation on a normal airliner.
Quote:
There is a visual indication of resultant SS inputs on PFD on ground.
Lotta' good that does at FL 350
The yoke in your gut on a normal airliner tells you the other pilot is pulling hard. You don't have to look at a display or at his hand, or a Trim in Motion alert. Does the A330 have a Trim in Motion alert?
From reading the many posts on this and previous threads, as well as some of the linked material, it appears to me that the Airbus design philosophy is biased against what might be called "tactile feedback" to the pilots. This bias appears, in turn, to stem from a philosophy that, in regular operations, it is best that the pilots to tell the computers what they want the airplane to do, rather than command the controls more or less directly to achieve aircraft performance.
In a sense, AB aircraft have two autopilots; the traditional one that would, in a conventional aircraft, command the controls to do what the pilots command via knobs and switches, and the flight control system, where the pilots move what appear to be more-or-less conventional controls (stick, pedals and throttle) that actually only command the computer to move the controls with considerable computer intermediation to achieve, for instance, a stable bank angle or a max climb angle without stalling the aircraft.
I can see how the idea that the pilots never actually command the controls would lead to AB believing that tactile feedback through the controls (or control position, as in moving throttles) is not necessary. But that philosophy is flawed on the rare occasions when the pilots actually are commanding the controls directly, as was the case for 447 in roll in ALT2 law. The PF had no feedback from the stick other than a/c performance, the PNF had no physical feedback from his controls re what the PF was doing, and (according to an earlier poster who had flown the 330 in ALT2 law) the aircraft performed quite differently in response to stick inputs than did the simulator, which of course is almost certainly the only time the PF experienced ALT2 law prior to the incident.
So, in essence, the PF was flying that particular configuration for the very first time that night, in the soup with contradictory speed indications, and without the other crew being able to fully follow just what he was doing.
This was compounded by AB using the same interface, with the same lack of tactile feedback, for two very different tasks: telling the computers to place the a/c in a certain attitude and hold it there in Normal Law vs directly commanding the ailerons in ALT2 law, which runs the serious risk of the PF not making the appropriate modifications to his inputs until after a short period of actual experience with the differences.