Hi Mig15,
why wasn't the aircraft flown using "pitch & power" to recover after the initial upset
I don't know why the crew didn't lower the nose sufficiently when they first received the "stall stall" warning.
However, when the IAS fell below 60kts the stall warning ceased - they may have believed that they had successfully recovered from the stall. The Captain entered the flight deck to observe:
FL 350 descending; 10,000 ft per min rate of descent; TOGA power and pitch attitude about 15 degs nose up with NO Stall Warning, and probably advised by his FO's that they have had unreliable air speed indications.
They have 2 mins and counting to sort that one out before it's too late.
I think it's a pity that the PNF was unaware of the stick inputs being made by the PF (due AB design). If they had control sticks which moved in response to the the other stick input - maybe the PNF would have recognised the stick full back requests?
Didn't some people believe the Titanic was unsinkable, so they were allowed to place fewer life boats on board than the passenger capacity? Sounds a bit like the absence stall recovery advice in the QRH in 2009.