it should have been considered by the airworthiness crowd just because it was a piece of electronics, shouldn't it?
You have a short memory Walter. Who uncovered what little evidence you have?
I have posted the following more than once....
It was noted by a BoI witness that (redacted) classified kit was on board. MoD have declined to say what this was.
The regulations of the day mandated that any classified kit be recorded in a separate section of the RTS. On security grounds, that section could be withheld from those RTS recipients who didn't need to know about the kit; but the existence of the classified section MUST be recorded so that all recipients know what they have in front of them may not be complete. Clearly, Odiham and Aldergrove would have the full RTS (or, in this case, a document "in the form of" an RTS; but omitting the mandated content of an RTS).
However, there is no classified section in the RTS. That means, with 100% certainty, that the regulations governing clearance of said kit were not implemented. It is doubtful if even the most basic work was undertaken by Boscombe or Boeing - both should have had a key role (e.g. Installation Design, Safety Case and EMC). This is supported by the
fact that not one single item of Nav or Comms kit onboard had Full or even Limited clearance for use; either in November 1993 when ACAS issued the RTS or on 2nd June 1994.
You continue to denigrate the "airworthiness crowd", whom I assume you take to include the AAIB and RAF Inspectorate of Flight Safety. The former made nine recommendations, all relating to airworthiness - some specific to Chinook, others generic (a reflection of the systemic failings ordered by senior RAF staffs). The latter, 48. Anything that is said on this thread about airworthiness is simply a refection and an extension of their work (as they didn't address the finer details). 14 and 16 years later, respectively, Mr Haddon-Cave made the same recommendations; although again he did not address the detail. That is, the same systemic failings remain (which means there are many who continue to obey orders instead of speaking up).
These are hard, undeniable
facts. You may not like them, but please don't denigrate those who deal in these
facts when, as others have said, you have not produced a shred of evidence to support your theory. As ever, I agree your theory is technically possible. I don't have a theory. I simply reiterate the
facts that the Chinook HC Mk2 RTS was 99% non-compliant with the regulations and there was no proper clearance to fly it.
That is an Organisational Fault of the highest magnitude and, in my opinion, raises doubt about the safety of the verdict against the pilots. I would go further - as the senior staffs involved had, for some years, been warned of the likely outcome of their anti-airworthiness policies, yet made quite deliberate decisions to not only ignore the warnings but issue orders to compromise airworthiness even further, then their actions amount to criminal negligence. Again, that is not just my opinion, it is a simple statement of
fact supported by internal MoD audit reports from January 1988 and June 1996; illustrating again a timeframe that spans Mull of Kintyre.