Now let me see if I've got this right.
1. There was a known SSR Mode C problem on the Claxby (and other) radars whereby the height returns could be unreliable when two aircraft are vertically separated but not laterally.
2. This did not pose a problem on the displays at West Drayton which did not show the spurious readings nor were the various safety devices triggered.
3. This causes a problem at Swanwick because the alerts for the separation monitoring function (commonly known as SMURF) and the STCA are triggered giving everybody unnecessary grief and lots of paperwork even though separation has never been compromised.
4. The excuse is that it wasn't spotted during testing even though it was a known deficiency and it seems reasonable to assume that somebody who knew about the radar system deficiency ought to have been looking for it.
5. The proposed solution is to apply unnecessary lateral separation to prevent the spurious alerts.
6. Swanwick Ops and management did not see fit to recommend a reduction in traffic prior to implementation of this procedure.
7. This came to light at the end of the summer traffic period.
In the words of one Victor Meldrew - " I don't believe it". My mischievous mind has to ask whether or not Swanwick would have been declared fit for purpose if those charged with saying so had known about the problem. Finally I have to ask what other gremlins might be lurking and who knows about them. Was the push to "O" date so irresistable that there is more than dust under the carpet?