BOAC;
'k, that clarifies and d'accord with your historical views as well...shoulda known.
A fbw system is inconsistent with the simplistic notion of the 'big red button'. The B777's reversion has never been discussed here but it does not have such a reversion either, although it is closer to DozyWannabe's notion.
DozyWannabe;
Thanks for engaging the broader (off-topic?) view. I'll respond to the first point and think about the others!
When I initially checked out (and upgraded as captain at the same time) on the A320 in 1992, the airplane still had the "Interim Standard", which did not have VNAV. The only AFS descent regimes were IDLE/OPEN DESCENT, SPD/HDG-VERTICAL SPEED or much more rarely SPD/TRK-FPA, (rarely used, because the descent from cruise was not the place to use a "path-oriented" tool that had not calculated the ToD. One could just hand-fly the descent which I did most of the time including ATs off.
Although the airline wanted its full time use, (from "just after takeoff 'til the end of the landing roll", was the SOP in the first manuals until we simply fought back and got it changed), automation was just a tool, in my back-pocket to use "when-if". That was my (cantankerous?) attitude then, and it didn't change when I retired off the A330/A340. Just to be clear because there's a lot of "I" here, I'm describing what was the case at the time, and not "holding court"...I don't like such behaviours but sometimes one has to speak out of personal experience.
So learning the airplane was a challenge and re-learning it when the "Full Standard" was introduced some time later. We got real FMGECs for the first time and the air was full of "what the hell is it doing now?". But disconnection was the rule because all the guys had flown the Lockheed, Douglas and Boeing equipment and knew, and flew it like a regular airplane and engaged the AP/AT when happy.
During that initial period we saw a lot of "why did they [Airbus] do this?" moments. We received a few visits from AB during the introduction of the airplane into the fleet. At meetings which the entire group of guys (who weren't flying) attended, we provided our feedback from our experience. I don't want to fully describe the engagement and reception but it was dismissive and even arrogant and it was that way over a long period of time. I was so frustrated at not getting answers or an ear that I went to other sources and found someone at the FAA who not only had an ear but participated in the certification work for the airplane in the US, so he knew what he was talking about. He's the guy who landed the airplane in Direct Law on manual THS trim only, just to see. We carried on a rich dialogue for a few years until I lost track but it was our experience as experienced pilots but new on the A320 that Airbus never came to the table to listen.
They may have had their "study group" and I've heard ET talk which I thoroughly enjoyed but it was a long time before AB began to actually listen to the end-users. That changed over the years, for reasons.
The documents posted by PerkyPerkins bear very careful reading, especially the parts about stall recovery and especially the parts regarding simulator work in reproducing states beyond "normal". I highly recommend this reading.
I completely dismissed as more public nonsense and talking without the benefit of actual evidence, the Spiegel article and professor Hutig's comments because, for reasons, I already knew that simulators were GIGO devices but that simulators replicate quite well, normal aircraft and system behaviour. We need to be far, far less credulous when reading what the media has to say about this accident. Shields and Crap Detectors need to be fully deployed!
Got to go.