Old China
Cross purposes, I think.
"
Welsh Wingman
"possible weather deviation limitations for this plane on this particular route (unless the flight crew want to land in Bordeaux and endear themselves to flight ops...)"
Weather deviations should cost peanuts in fuel quantity (ask your math teacher) so can we put this one to bed please... "
I didn't mean the particular de minimis deviation cost in this instance, but rather in the wider systemic issues that I was discussing. I was under the impression that this plane was close to MTOW at GIG and this route is close to its maximum range (never flown an A330-200 or any other Airbus before retiring in 1992, so not claiming any expertise), so merely hypothesising whether the BEA are hypothesising about the wisdom/relevance (if any) of even sending pilots into the ITCZ in the knowledge that a "major" weather diversion could mean a refuelling stop short of destination. I recall an old SAA friend telling me a few years back that some SAA pilots were frustrated at having to fly the A340-600 on the Joburg/New York route, when a longer range A340-500 would be perfect for the route if SAA had properly invested in the right equipment for the route.
Feel free to shoot this down, now that I have made clear. Not arguing that this is likely to be one of the major factors in the hull loss, but wouldn't yet discount it altogether from the overall mix in the context of not always giving equatorial CBs the healthy respect they deserve (unless I am wrong about my understanding of the range of the A330-200, which I accept that I might well be).
Not wanting to send anyone off on a wild goose chase.
I was thinking more about my old history teacher rather than my math teacher - divide-up the understanding of historical events into long-term causes (aviation industry focus?), short-term causes (aircraft manufacturer and/or aircraft operator focus?) and triggers (aircraft operator SOPs and flight deck focus?)....