t54, I am confused again.
I read somewhere that the initial two stall warnings were a valid response to the invalid 60kt pitot reading.
Maybe the stall warning comes first in the relevant part of the computer program , before the validation of the data upon which the stall warning is based?
Stall warnings, and stall
α, are shown in HazelNuts39's graph
They are based on AoA, the magnitude of which is influenced by airspeed/mach number.
I don't understand how you reach the idea of a stall warning based on an invalid (or even a valid) airspeed reading, since stall warnings are (should be?) based upon AoA which is not the same as airspeed. It is a different parameter, influenced by airspeed, attitude, gross weight, angle of bank, G, air density ... etc
From earlier posts: what the 60 knots threshold seems to have triggered is a disabling of a stall warning, which is itself enabled by an AoA reading as shown in HazelNuts39's graph.
Does that make sense?
Anyway, could the assumption by the PF that the initial short stall warnings were valid explain the climb?
Do you mean due to an increase in power as a response to stall warning?
Not an Airbus driver, but my assumption on stall response is decrease AoA via attitude change, and increasing power with the intent of increasing speed and thus decreasing, for the same attitude, AoA further away from stall margin. (EDIT: if you don't recognize or know you are stalled, or believe you are not stalled, you might not make that response).
For bear:
Am I wrong in taking for granted that in Commercial flight at the "edge", Pitch and N1 are insufficient to keep the flight safe?
Based on PPRuNe posts regarding this crash, posts made by actual airline pilots who fly heavies at those altitudes, posts since about 02 June 2009, the answer to your question is that pitch and power are indeed, and should be, sufficient to maintain flight.
The estimates back then frequently led to "didn't know to fly pitch and power? If they didn't why didn't they?"
Info to date released by BEA seems to confirm that setting pitch and power for that altitude and desired performance isn't what happened ... but the
why remains elusive at present.
If Pitch and Power are the fallback, de jure, someone needs to teach the Airbus pilot to fly AoA? Okay, Fine?
Not really. If pitch and power are the standard fall back, (and it appears that numerous pilots and airlines have procedures that are precisely just that for UAS conditions, and these work,) then "flying AoA" is a subsequent skill set suitable for other flying applications.
Referring to AoA as a crosscheck if Airspeed becomes unreliable has been suggested (to confirm "what is my wing doing?") as a suitable improvement to the pilot's tool kit. (A lesson learned, if you wish).