For BOAC: we both seem to have seen something amiss in two different threads, and that article, from a different entering point.
I share your question. Does it or doesn't it (in re AoA at 30?)
For Bear:
The idea of teaching Air France pilots to fly AoA would require an AoA gage in the cockpit (not likely any time soon) and probably isn't as important a training issue for Air France as:
"How do we confirm basic fly pitch and power handling, and basic instrument flying skills, are up to the standards we expect and assume?"
The answer to that ain't trivial. What if the average AF pilot is a perfectly good, or even above average, instrument pilot. What if the line pilots are found to be good to very good through a sampling that shows skills and knowledge up to standards.
Then what do you do? What if that particular person/event match up was anomalous? Would you tamper with a system (back to Deming's caution against that) when most of your data show it operating well?
This is where the pilots in Air France doubtless have a crucial role, and ought to be listened to carefully, in any attempt to change
something.
For OK:
It’s interesting that no one has commented on the fact that the initial stall warning termination (though assumed due to unreliable data) also coincided with the Captain’s arrival and attempt to provide verbal info. If I were up front I might instinctively hit the EMER CANC so I could fully hear what he was saying. (Maybe someone has brought this up and I missed it here in the 3 volumes of “War & Peace”.)
Sounds like a PNF action.