2 of the pilots had FAA IRs, one an IMCr and one a PPL. I suspect they all thought that they were applying "a certain level of intelligence, presence and ability to assess situations". To me it illustrates, amongst other things, the seductive danger of making up your own rules because you judge it to be ok.
Well exactly - the fact that three of them were doing something they were "qualified" to do, didnt help them. Believing that you are displaying intelligence and presence is very different from displaying intelligence and presence. You would be a fool to think any set of rules can protect you from a misplaced belief.
On the subject of relevance, how is the Milk Float story relevant to Nick's question? What analogy are you drawing between that and a pilot confronted with a solid overcast, as described in his question?
421C - now I am worrying about you, isnt it obvious?
Let me put it another way. Nick turns up at his destination at FL45, there is a solid undercast with tops 4,500 and the METAR reports the base at 3,500. He has checked his MSA which is 2,500 for miles around. He is OCAS. His diversion is 40 minutes away and this being France he cant get the weather for his diversion. He has an IMCr, (or he could have a JAA IR, and a FAA 61.8 without instrument priviliges and be flying an N reg aircraft) is very current and wouldnt think twice about making the descent in the UK. In fact he notes there are even bits in the cloud layer where he can just make out the ground. 
Now what would you do? Ah, I know declare a Pan, or maybe even a Mayday, or divert, find there is also the same overcast at your diversion and again declare a Pan, or Mayday, or perhaps you did that before you diverted to make sure you had really got everyones attention? OK, so if that is your assessment of the situation, sure play it that way 
just the same as staying behind the milk float for the three mile stretch.
Let me give you a real life example. Many years ago I did some aero sorties with a BA training captain. His background; well a few years in the RAF, fast jets and all that old boy, how many tens of thousands of hours with BA, I dont recall, well we got ourselves above the overcast through a hole and played around doing some loops but when it was time to stop playing I was horrified to see the holes had all but disappeared. I didnt have an instrument rating. Strangely enough nor did he - well not single crew SEP. I cant recall exactly what we did as we found ourselves at 3,500 feet in 10K vis beneath the base that we had previously been above but then again I wasnt flying at the time. I dont recall the acknowledgement of a Pan but who knows maybe he had inadvertently selected the wrong frequency and didnt get any response so used some common sense and a little intelligence. Whether he was up to the descent of course was questionable.
My stupidity was brought home very forcefully when faced with the challenge of trying to follow a DCT routing in controlled airspace in a busy TMA to a grass airfield with no navigation or approach aids in solid, turbulent IMC in a rented club cherokee with no autopilot, 1 radio, 1 VOR, no RNAV, no glideslope receiver and no mode C transponder without the faintest idea of how I was going to descend at the end of the flight. Fear of prosecution held me back from declaring an emergency, another highly questionable decision.
Sorry to be blunt, but you were stupid.
This has nothing to do with my examples any more than most of the earlier post. You didnt make an intelligent assessment of the situation.
Last edited by Fuji Abound; 2nd June 2011 at 11:24.