If you look at the findings of crash AF358 a lack of training, missing procedures and improper judgement seem to be the case. Of course this was a different situation than AF447 but it might indicate a not perfect safety culture and lack of or improper training within the airline.
]Conclusions (Wikipedia) AF358
The TSB concluded in their final report that the pilots had missed cues that would have prompted them to review their decision to land.[33] In their report[14] the TSB cited that
Air France had no procedures related to distance required from thunderstorms during approaches and landings
After the autopilot had been disengaged, the pilot flying increased engine thrust in reaction to a decrease in airspeed and a perception that the aircraft was sinking (spatial disorientation). The power increase contributed to an increase in aircraft energy and the aircraft deviated above the flight path.
At 300*feet above ground level, the wind changed from a headwind to a tailwind.
While approaching the threshold, the aircraft entered an intense downpour and the forward visibility became severely reduced.
When the aircraft was near the threshold, the crew members committed to the landing and believed their go-around option no longer existed.
The pilot not flying did not make the standard callouts concerning the spoilers and thrust reversers during the landing roll. This contributed to the delay in the pilot flying selecting the thrust reversers.
There were no landing distances indicated on the operational flight plan for a contaminated runway condition at the Toronto / Lester B. Pearson International Airport.
The crew did not calculate the landing distance required for runway 24L despite aviation routine weather reports (METARs) calling for thunderstorms. The crew were not aware of the margin of error.
The topography at the end of the runway beyond the area and the end of Runway 24L contributed to aircraft damage and injuries to crew and passengers.