TheShadow
from what I can judge, you seem to have a fairly consistent story there.
If, and it's of course all still speculation, but if you're right, then there's a number of things to be addressed in the aftermath.
It seems that automation, albeit no doubt helpful and safe in most cases, was a factor here, or rather: the way the automation behaves when pushed outside the anticipated envelope (Stall warning silenced / reappearing)
Another factor is the question what parameters are available to the pilots in those extreme situations. I wonder what the rationale is not to have an AoA display, even in situations when the AoA is clearly way out of the normal. (btw, how many AoA vanes are there on a 330? I know I've seen three on Boeing types)
Training of extreme situations is yet another area that will have to be revisited. Have airlines become overly confident that automation will keep the plane inside it's operatinal envelope at all times? After all, the most important function of the guys and gals up front is to save the day in the (unlikely) event of the automation "losing situational awareness" and handing the whole mess over to the humans.
Lastly, I still think that Airbus might have gone too far in removing tactile clues such as coupled movement of the side sticks (how does the PNF know what the PF is doing on the stick in extreme situations like this?) and, albeit not relevant in this case, tactile feedback on the thrust levers. Eyes and ears are limited bandwidth channels and to forego the additional, very direct, tactile channel does seem to be a less than smart engineering decision.
[edit]
so I just found that the A330 has three AoA vanes just as any other self respecting jet. Makes me wonder even more why it's not displayed everywhere since traditional logic would say "one for the CPT, one for the FO and one for the backup instruments". Oh well.