From ST27:
Once descending, the rate of descent didn't change, so passengers would have only sensed that the nose was pointed up, somewhat like an initial climbout on takeoff on say a DC-10 or 757. There also would have been heavy buffeting. Given that they were flying at night in a storm, the passengers would have had no outside references to know what was happening, and would not have known they were falling. A clue would have been the change in cabin pressure, but how many passengers would connect that with rapid descent?
If like me you click on the flight map when woken by turbulence, you might notice a drop in altitude/airspeed...
From ST27:
More rubbish from Der Spiegel. Air France was in the process of changing out the pitot tubes. They received their first shipment of replacement parts a week before the accident, but had not applied them to that particular aircraft.
Yes, but as you yourself point out they waited two years to do so because EASA told them, quote: "...[that it saw] no unsafe condition that warrants a mandatory modification of the Thales pitot tubes." So whether you blame AF for ignoring the soft Airbus recommendation, or AB for its soft recommendation, or EASA for its hard statement, clearly when even the manufacturer of a part says its a problem these things should not happen. EASA should be focused on one thing only - SAFETY. At least EASA - unlike the FAA - is not operator funded, so it has no excuse.