c.g./THS effectiveness/elevator effectiveness/ etc
I can't conclude that the 'bus THS and the elevator were "blanked" or rendered ineffective to to the downwash or vortices from the main wing without seeing more data. Flight test results would be supreme, but who wants to take a big jet beyond the design limits to prove the point?
Further, and sadly, Airbus has assured us it is almost impossible to "lose control" of that jet. That assertion seems to permeate the crew training and design corrective actions by Airbus following certain incidents.
I'll let that aspect of my observations recede and prolly not raise it again for a long time.
to Garrison, Tk, et al:
I initially thought a "deep stall" such as we had in the Viper could explain the flight path of the jet ( not crew actions). But looking at many charts and manuals causes me to reconsider that theory.
Tk now raises the issue of the actual c.g. of the jet at onset of the episode. I had already looked at the graph Tk has just posted ( many moons ago), and was initially surprised that the aft c.g. values were as large as they were. And we now question the actual c.g. values used by the cosmic flight control computers?
All that being said, I will throw my vote in with 'bird in that the elevator control authority is drastically reduced when the THS is near max limits. It is even less effective at very high AoA and aft c.g.
I also go with Garrison on the point that recovery would/might have been possible using available system inputs and control surface authority. Might have taken a long and constant stick input and maybe touching the forbidden trim wheel, but possible. With that being said, it unfair to require the crew to be NASA "golden arms" or Chuck Yeager clones.