promani, (and others) this foaming at the mouth to find somebody to blame, particularly a deceased somebody, is unseemly. It is also most definitely not BEA's charter. Their charter is to make aviation safer through impartial investigations of accidents.
It does not good to assign fault to say, the pilot, and wash your hands of the entire event leaving it to the court to finish stomping on a corpse to help some people obtain an emotional release (and financial killing.) The BEA must figure out WHY something failed and correct that situation.
Let's use some fanciful names and events to remove some of the emotion for a moment. Please bear with me here to get a notion of what I mean. We're not here to assign blame. We're here to make aviation safer.
Suppose we have a floobie. A floobie pingles widgets. This is a very complex floobie. It requires a rangant for it to function. At any given time it typically has hundreds of users per floobie. It has failed killing many users and the available data indicates the rangant "obviously" did something stupid.
Is this enough to make using floobies safer? It may satisfy some blood lust. "Let's take that rangant out, slap it around, and hang it from the yard arm even if it's already broken beyond repair."
It does not satisfy the need for safer use of floobies. We must figure out why the floobie's rangant twisted its left plooker button. Did the rangant get spurious inputs? Was the rangant's programming (training) incorrect or in some way inadequate? Was the rangant overloaded with conflicting data?
What actions can take place to make floobies safer to use? Some here seem to be suggesting ripping out all the telserboxes from the floobie and make the rangant do things the old way, fessling the grommetvents directly. There is a small point here if one neglects documented safety records that state usually floobies that use telserboxes all seem to pingle along more safely than when the rangant fessles grommetvents directly.
So it seems we must make sure the rangant does not mess up again under the particularly unusual conditions that contributed to its incorrectly twisting the left plooker button. What can be done to "clean up" the data input to this poor overloaded rangant when it is faced with a cascade of failures such as observed? Could better programming (training) of the rangant for real world conditions help? When their programming is tested they already know the test. "We start nearly feeblevetzed and you have to recover from a complete feeblevetz." What does the Rangant do when it's "surprised" (its programming had not prepared ot to recognize this) by feeblevetzing conditions?
It seems to me this latter objective is more important than the emotional release obtained by stomping that already dead defective rangant into itty bitty pieces in a fit of judicial temper.
And, yes, this has a deliberate resemblance to the case at hand here. Somebody determined enough could plot it out. I'm seeing shouts of "kill (blame) the pilot!" I don't see realistic searches for methods to repair the situation? I'm not even seeing many efforts to determine why a rangant might exhibit anomalous behavior when faced by the stimuli set we know, perhaps with the inclusion of some stimuli we don't know.