There are all sorts of possibilities, including an unreported (by ACARS) tail deice failure, but a good Occamite would say that what we have here is sufficient unto itself. The vulnerability of the Thales pitots was known in advance; and the proneness of flight crews to become utterly confused and to do seemingly insane things when confronted with inconsistent airspeed/attitude information and uncertainty about systems behavior is well known from previous incidents, notably ones involving pitot icing. So even the fragmentary information we now have is not inconsistent with history (though it seems to be inconsistent with what a lot of pilots think they would have done if they had been there) and shouldn't astonish us. What would be astonishing is if there is no rethinking of pilot/flight data interfaces, especially with regard to AoA, after this -- though once the dust settles this, like previous crew-befuddlement accidents, will probably come to seem more and more like a freak outlier and less and less like a call for systems improvement.