Not So Simple ?
IMO there's too much over simplification going on here, I don't believe the pilots were incompetent - even 20 years after I last flew anything the recovery from a stall is ingrained. Hence:
(a) Are we sure that the nose up trim was added manually rather than automatically by the aircraft ?
(b) Why did the pilot keep pulling up when, with our near perfect knowledge, the opposite would have been more successful ? I'd suggest that the cockpit's displays had completely confused the sufficiently experienced crew and they were tracking a plausible (but wrong) hypothesis based on what they concluded from the displays.
(c) Perhaps there is something wrong with the Airbus assumption of how crews process data, particularly conflicting data combined with lots of visual and aural warnings, set against a system (=the plane) whose outputs depend upon which mode the system is in ?
(d) It would seem that the Airbus approach to automation works in 99.99% of the time and during that time is probably the most efficient and safe approach. However in the remaining 0.01% of the time a 'deep s***' mode is needed whereby only the basics are displayed & communicated. If these had included a height, an angle of attack and a (perhaps GPS calculated) speed, things would have become clear to the crew.
(e) How much height is needed to recover from an A330 near stall, stall and deep stall ?