I noticed a mistake in my original that you quote - a critical missing "NOT"!
The real key to this accident will be to figure out why the PF thought holding full back stick all the way down was the correct response. I don't jump to a conclusion that it was simply "error." I'd like to see as good a re-creation as possible, from the data, of what the cockpit environment was actually telling the crew (alarms, instruments, ECAM messages, seat-of-the-pants, etc.).
Two of the clues that normally identify a stall would have been missing (airspeed) or perhaps disguised (buffet in the middle of convective turbulence - the pilots clearly were expecting buffets from turbulence, having changed course and warned the cabin). Pitch on the AH is not a trustworthy indicator of AoA (one can be 20° nose-down and still stalled with a 35° AoA).
I can't conceive of holding full back stick for 4 minutes in any aircraft. But I also can't conceive of any other trained pilot doing it unless some outside influence was suggesting such a bad idea was really a "good" idea. So "why"?