As JCjeant said it, >300 posts over speculation, human-vs-computer battle.
But this accident is like any-other a combination of several factors and their consequences, I'll try to summarize those :
1°/ Pitot failures
- No more valid speed indication
- A/P A/T disconnection (corrective actions taken by crew : "I have controls")
-Switching to alternalte law (Identified by PM "Alternate law")
2°/ Climb to FL380
-The report says that after the initial right bank the pilot performed a corrective action with a left and up S/S deflection.
-Pitch gradually increase over 10°UP. Vertical speed goes to 7000fpm (corrective action : Pitch down)
-Bank values oscillating between 12°right and 10°left. (Corrected by the pilot, but maybe a hint of the flight enveloppe limitation and turbulences)
3°/ First stall warning and pilot corrections
-PF sets TO/GA, and Up-stick force (Seemingly an approach to stall procedure on a non-FBW aircraft : power and initially a small up-stick force as a reflex to maintain constant pitch)
-Consequence of the up-stick force on the A330:
-The pilot fly a G-acceleration, thus constant upward acceleration is commanded as long as the stick is in the 'up' sector
-Auto-trim sets THS up to 13°
4°/ Stall At one point between 02h10'51 and 02h11'40
AoA rises to 16° which is the basic stall AoA at low altitude, at FL380 stall will surely occur at a lower AoA.
5°/ Entering "deep-stall" Between 02h11'40 and 02h12'02 ---> Lasting 22sec only. At a maximum altitude of FL380 the A330 is now completely stalled and descending.
-AoA reaches 40°(Computers switches to 'Abnormal attitude law' (AoA>30°) and auto-trim is disable (Trim wheel is now stuck at 13° up even if it could have been moved by the PF, but with no force-feedback on the stick how to use the trim without QRH/FCOM references?)
6°/ Stall warning 'bugs' begin
-The AoA is so high that Pitot airflow might stall, showing speed below 60kts
-Stall Horn STOPS (IMHO one of the key info that kept the crew in a wrong situation awareness)
7°/ More corrective actions from PF at ~02h12'17
-Pitch down input (correct action to get out of the stall)
-As airfow gets back in the pitots 'speed became valid' and Stall Horn rings again.
(IMHO this is the other key info given to the pilots: the PF brain might have taken it as a logical computer :
Alarm rings ---> Erroneous Action ---> What was my last action? ---> Pitch down input <---CONCLUSION---> Pitch-down input = Error)
As the aircraft is still in a stall with a more than 10.000ft/min rate of descent, the BEA did not communicate on the period between FL350 and FL100 but a major brainstorm/communication or even actions might have taken place in the flight deck.
8°/Approaching FL100
-Less than one minute before impact
-The other pilot takes over (or maybe the captain from behind)
-Only info is 'AoA remained over 35°'
(We do not have any info on the last minute inputs, possibly a desperate maneuver)
I hope this will help picture out the overall situation, so people don't only focus only on one computer or one pilot input.