One point bothers me. Putting aside the possibility that the crew was simply overwhelmed by multiple sensory inputs and just could not think straight (and I suspect that we all have been in such a situation from time to time in the box), how is it that the observation of
(a) a reasonably level or nose up attitude plus
(b) low IAS plus
(c) a shedload of ROD
doesn't immediately equal the mental deduction of stall ?
J.T., My initial reaction after reading the BEA document was to exclaim:
"Put these guys flying the Airbus in a real airplane and make them explore the limits."
This airborne simulator that babies them is ruining them!"
But then I wondered what kind of indications the PF had on his panel to make him do such a silly thing. I concluded it was initially probably very different from the side the DFDR was reporting on.
It has been said elsewhere that experiences that do not kill me make me stronger. This is particularly true in aviation.