Dozy Wannabe:
You can't make a computer perform tasks with data that it known to be erroneous, it's just a logical impossibility...
Just so we're clear - one last time. Based on the evidence we have so far, flight control protections and the software that defines them are unlikely to be directly relevant in this accident sequence, because they were disabled very early on in that sequence, precisely as they were designed to.
It's
PRECISELY the DESIGN that needs a review. The AP/AT were no doubt in Alt Hold and Spd Hold modes. The A/P has inputs from 3 A/S sources for good reason: they vote. If two or more go wonky, the AP should have enough intelligence to reject them all and go into flywheel mode, holding the last power and pitch setting. It should then send an SOS to the pilots, giving them the decision to take over, or let the flywheel run awhile.
See, a really capable AP could do that smoothly without going off in a pout.
GB