If both PFD's and the ISIS had correct ATTITUDE information, then application of significant forward S/S pressure to place the pitch attitude well below the horizon, irrespective of the IAS indications across the cockpit, would probably have changed the outcome.
Unfortunately, this comes with hindsight and a wider knowledge of the changed Airbus procedure for stall recovery. (which incidentally, is the same as the stall recovery I was taught in light aircraft in the late 1960's! - ie reduce the angle of attack).
Development of the Airbus flight control systems during the 1980's focused so much on the level of protections, that there was no real thought by Airbus engineers that a line crew would ever be confronted with the events that AF447 ultimately experienced.
Stall recovery at that time was based on TOGA thrust, perhaps along the lines of propeller aircraft that developed significant airflow over the wings due to prop wash when power was increased? This was not unique to Airbus.
Habsheim (Idle thrust into the trees) and Air INTER (incorrect FPA set) created the first clues that modifications needed to be made to the AB flight control and FCU systems - and it's been a steady stream of changes since then.
The latest incarnation of the UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED reinforces attitude flying + thrust setting = performance.
This works well at lower levels provided it's followed. Around the FL 350 area in a very heavy 320 / 321 / 330 / 340 , I don't think setting 5 degrees nose up and CLIMB thrust would be such a good idea ?? At these levels, there is virtually no margin between cruise and climb thrust and all that's going to happen is a speed reduction. At standard ECON speeds, it won't take long for the speed decay to reach VLS and below.
This checklist needs to be modified to look at higher flight level recovery.
Up until now, triplicated computer systems as installed in Airbus products can provide problems. If 2 of the three say one thing, the voting system will assume they are correct and "outvote" the third and possibly only correct system. This is one very important reason to get pitch attitude and thrust settings from the QRH to check what is really going on.
At heavy weights and high levels, I have the descent numbers from the QRH U/Airspeed checklist (IDLE thrust and the appropriate pitch attitude) handy and that's what I would be using (after recovering from any STALL warning) , until we can establish which instruments are correct.
Much more basic training needs to be provided by manufacturers during type ratings so that we have a much bigger awareness of the art of attitude flying.
Far too much reliance on automated systems is causing as many issues as these systems were designed to address.
In many years of Airbus experience, I have had two events that required manual flight and attitude intervention due to IAS irregularities. Both involved icing events.
I wonder what the real number of these occurrences has been over the last 20 years ?