takata wrote :
That may be the confusion if one is only trained to low alt, low speed, Normal Law stall recovery, even if both Pilots aknowledged they were in Alternate Law. Something that need a serious investigation here.
Agreed.
PENKO wrote :
And it is not a momentary confusion either, it is a persistent pitch up command. There were two other pilots there who did not react to this inconsistent action by the PF which makes it all the more puzzling. I maintain that we are missing half the information.
Agreed, too.
One hypothesis is along the lines of "stall training" such as airline pilots usually get during recurrent simulator training. Since the aircraft is reputedly "protected" against stall, training for upset recovery, stall identification and recovery has been, at best, extremely poor. The only manoeuver which is considered is "approach to stall, minimum altitude loss". And as
takata pointed out, in Normal Law, perhaps modified through landing configuration (such as was attempted in Perpignan).
In this specific sequence of "approach to stall, minimum altitude loss", the reaction is to power out of pre-stall condition using TOGA thrust, maintaining some kind of "average" pitch attitude. This is of course completely self-defeating in a high-altitude post-stalled condition. But this condition must be
identified first...
Both major manufacturers produced together a video document about upset recovery a few years back. But that was likely the only "training" the accident flight pilots ever got about it. And of course, I am with those who will claim that a
pilot should know how to get out of a stall (like someone mentioned from a beginner's PPL experience, very valid point).
Unfortunately, what we have here is the glaring example of why pilots should remain pilots for real, and not become system operators, or cockpit managers, or what have you. The design of any aircraft, especially one as revolutionary in its time as that which appeared in the late eighties, will have an influence on what the role, function, skillset, attitude of those on the flight deck will become. I maintain that these changes were intentional, but of course not from individual engineers or programmers, this is ludicrous. It is a
political decision.
One does not live through the career of an airline pilot in isolation, working their skill at home with personal dedication. Any airline pilot is essentially the product of a whole system, regulator, airline and manufacturer included. The only personal thing that can be added to this is personal light aircraft training (as can or cannot be afforded depending on work and wages conditions...), homework with the FCOM and other documents, personal discipline regarding sleep, food, physical activity, and personal ethics.
But even if I was ready to pay for it in person (I cannot), I doubt I could get even a 12hrs simulator training syllabus to get me vaguely up to par about all the upset and stall conditions I would have perhaps to face one day in a large heavy jet airliner. But in all likelyhood, I will
never face these conditions. How expensive would that
statistically useless training make me ?
Finally, as the pilot's responsibility with the life or death of his charges justifies inquiring in detail into all his actions even post-mortem (and this occasionally includes very personal details), similarly, the authority claimed by the aircraft (design policy-makers, technical designers, head of project and so on) over life and death "protection" justifies that it be subjected to a similarly detailed scrutiny. There is enough evidence already to justify such scrutiny.