If mm43 looks disappointed, I find much in this factual report.
The main theory of a deep stall from altitude is validated. An initial climb, preceding the final descent, is established.
Many theories can be trashed (now we can concentrate on useful stuff) :
- reengagement of A/P
- only one pilot at the controls (all 3 were in !)
- vertical stabilizer separation
- blindly entering CBs
- dual flameout or other engine problems
- longer than ~4min flight time
- manual reset of PRIM1 and SEC1
- attempted ditching
- multiple upset sequence
- exotic impact attitudes
- extreme turbulence
- lightning
- grossly unprofessional behavior
BEA wrote :
The airplane’s angle of attack increased progressively beyond 10 degrees and the plane started to climb. The PF made nose-down control inputs and alternately left and right roll inputs.
Feels strange to me...
The trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) passed from 3 to 13 degrees nose-up in about 1 minute and remained in the latter position until the end of the flight.
Suspiciously similar to Perpignan.
The airplane was subject to roll oscillations that sometimes reached 40 degrees. The PF made an input on the sidestick to the left and nose-up stops, which lasted about 30 seconds.
Were these oscillations desired by the PF ? The following insistent "input" feels like a "spin out of it" attempt (perhaps misguided), but no mention of rudder position during this...
Too bad the right side speed indication is absent from recordings. Overspeed reading, prompting a climb reaction from PF ? Or overspeed sensed, triggering a nose-up reaction by FCCs ? Or just plain stress degrading finer motor control and producing arm tension on the sidestick ?
Heading on impact seems consistent with the wreckage field now.
Note 1: The angle of attack is the angle between the airflow and longitudinal axis of the airplane. This information is not presented to pilots.
No comment, I am too busy crying.
Many things to say about training for high-altitude stall
recognition and
recovery... Such training had been discarded because "protections" would prevent it...
Some of us were having a discussion about deliberate pilot "dumbing-down"... It seems it is only the start of it...
As a general comment, I would say this initial sharing of facts describes only one side of the accident, pilot reaction (as usual).
I rest my case : Flight Controls still need a very detailed inquiry regarding their behavior in this, for the philosophical and technical reasons I exposed earlier. I am disappointed at the lack of "facts" made available regarding this touchy subject. At the very least, correlation between sidestick commands, individual FCCs reaction to them, aircraft reaction to these processed commands, and the established anomalies affecting certain FCCs, will certainly get my attention.
Svarin