Hi Chris,
Originally Posted by syseng68k
If you think that this is not the case, then please explain...
My main concern with jcjeant's post is that it is posted from a source which is not quoted at the first place. (Now, it is also translated with meaningless sentences). Anyway, I know that it is taken from a place where you can only find a compilation of documents (duely commentented) aimed at charging Airbus for its
so many so-called
wrong doings. There is nothing objective in such compilation as any communication on safety issues can be freely used as a proof of what they are suggesting:
they did nothing and everything was aimed at discharging the manufacturer in case of trouble.
I myself posted about it, saying that it was a long story with Airbus "probe issues" (including the part of the manual dated from December 1999 explaining how to indentify unreliable air data).
Nonetheless, the way this issue is presented and commented is completely misleading:
Fact #1: Airbus did certainly something when the first issues appeared with Goodrich/ Rosemount P/N 0851GR which was the original probe on A330 (and issues were quite different from today context)... they developped with Goodrich the P/N 0851HL (not the Thales/Sextant C16195AA and later BA).
Fact#2: They worked on systems like the BUSS (Back-Up Speed System) and invested further in R&D technology (l@aser probes, etc.).
Fact#3: Emphasis was also put on the crew training for detecting any possible Air data issues ; the fact is that possible Air data issues must be, in any case, monitored in flight because there is plenty of different cases following various "contaminations" of an anemometric chain. This is not a single case issue with a single procedure to follow as it is too complex to indentify correctly what is causing those Air data to be unreliable at the first place.
Now, it may appear that the weakest link was the last one and we'll see that tomorow. From what I have read on the crew training by Air France, they were simply not drilled at tackling this situation at cruise level: a single training was made months ago about another critical situation (UAS in approach or landing phase), but here, there was no switch to Alternate Law and the basic reaction would have to be quite different in this case, with much more thinking (and time) about what to do before altering their flight parameters (possibly safe when this event started).