BEARFOIL
As the design consideration is approached in real time, redundant systems simply fail together. If one system has sensors that have different designs, the chance of double or triple fail becomes remote.
Insert the word 'identical' in front of 'redundant' and I will fully concur. That was also the point of my earlier post seeking diversity in critical systems.
Yes, additional sensors will increase the logistic tail required to support an aircraft.
I would not advocate wholesale replacement of pitot tubes with a 'new concept' system, that would destroy diversity, not improve it.
Some are pointing to the fact we have documented ~18 instances of Airbus pitot tube freeze up with no adverse result. If AF447 is the one with the adverse result, then how do those statistics look?
Pretty P poor.
Even if we had 500 instances with one bad result, the rate is still unacceptable. The key to good outcomes is avoiding unnecessary risk.
Suppose there is a functional laser airspeed system available already. Suppose the barrier to its use is "we already have a good system with the pitot tube." Don't you think it is possible that by being technological Luddites, we may be holding back a promising new development that only needs a foot in the door to advance? (And to the best of my knowledge, none of my $$ is invested in such a company offering such an airspeed monitoring system.)
In the near term, I like MM43's idea about tiding the aircraft over until things can be stabilized. Give those easily confused computers some realistic data to chew on.
