AF 447: What the BEA will not tell!
(Recovery: this note was posted on this blog June 11, 2009)
Those who pay attention to communications from BEA after an accident to know what method to use that body to convey its message.
BEA determines the direct cause of an accident and assigns it a number of contributing parameters. For example, in the report of the crash of the Fokker 28 of the company's Regional Pau January 25, 2007, the BEA said that the crash resulted from a loss of control during takeoff and that may have been contributed to the accident awareness limited risk associated with icing, a lack of awareness among the crew of procedures for checking the surface condition in icing conditions, the ordinary aspect of the flight etc.. In this example, the BEA has overshadowed the fatigue of the crew which was subjected to a short night and therefore insufficient rest.
This archaic method allows to rank the errors and thus give them a greater or lesser extent. In general, the BEA, the main cause is always the one who, chronologically, is the latest. It is the result of the crew. That is what the audience holds.
It is convenient to limit the mistakes in the cockpit. This avoids the question for example the operation of the company and the bodies responsible for control, recurrent defects of aircraft etc..
To explain the tragedy of Flight 447, the BEA will say that the main cause of the accident was the inability of drivers to maintain the A330 in its flight and that may have been contributed to the accident of defects Pitot probes and weather.
It is the sense of first communications from Airbus and EASA and probably "the option" chosen by the political power so that there is a minimum of collateral damage ...
Claim that an accident is the result of one cause is the misinformation. If the drivers make mistakes, no one can deny that they are not the only ones to commit.
Systemic analysis advocated by ICAO is the opposite: we must determine all the barriers that have failed in preventing the accident.
This is the model of REASON. It requires investigators to incorporate the latent causes in the chain of events leading to the accident. That is really annoying when it comes to protecting a manufacturer, administration, industry etc..
The latent causes ..., BEA does not know!
Yet there are some in this drama ...
Deficiencies · a supplier Airbus (Pitot probes)
· Deficiencies of feedback (BEA, Airbus, DGCA, EASA, Air France ...)
· Lack of "airworthiness directive" concerning the change of the probes (EASA)
Function of Air France (flight plan, weather parameters)
• Choice of business objectives (Air France)
· Culture of Security (Air)
· Etc..
But that BEA will not tell!
Note added date: Friday, BEA will describe a "context" (read the note of May 21 on this) which increased the workload of pilots and led to a reduction in their ability to control the flight of the A330. These are the terms used by EASA and the others in the AD as of August 10, 2009 he was acting to remove the pitot probe Thales SA in an emergency. So, nothing new that they already knew at the time ...