syseng68k;
The other point, again, is the probes.
. . . .
Someone correct me if i'm adrift here, but "for want of a nail" seems
quite appropriate w/respect to the probes...
Respectfully, I disagree.
The point in this accident is NOT the probes.
A loss of airspeed information is not cause for Loss of Control.
A series of ECAM messages and chimes, (expected, with such loss of data), is not a cause for LOC.
A loss of attitude information IS cause for LOC but as far as we know, that did not occur here.
In previous pitot incidents, the exact same ECAM messages occurred. The crews continued to fly and within a few moments/minutes indications returned to normal.
We see such "ECAM streams" of multiple faults/failures in the simulator, during practised dual hydraulic failures for example.
As aircraft systems degrade, they engage in their monitoring/BITE behaviours and, according to their individual timings in sending data to the FWC which in turn are distributed to the CMC, DMUs etc, there will be a cascade of re-prioritizing messages until things settle down. I have seen such streams, many times in the simulator, once, during a serious hydraulic emergency in the air. In such circumstances, one must slow things down, wait and respond deliberately, with "pace", but not hurry.
I have previously observed that the UAS QRH drill memorized items to set the pitch at 15, 10, or 5deg and to set the power to the TOGA detent or in the last two cases, to the CLB detent, are intended for immediate "safe" responses right after takeoff, (catering to the Birgenair and Aeroperu accidents). The qualifying condition is at the end of the memorized items, which states that once the aircraft is above the MSA it should be leveled off for "troubleshooting". Such troubleshooting means getting out the QRH and reading-doing the checklist items. The first items involve appropriate pitch and power settings for weights and altitudes.
Ergo, none of the memorized items in the UAS QRH checklist applied here.
The first response would be to
do nothing and touch nothing while the QRH was brought out.
The airplane was stable before the event, and, short of significant disturbance either through heavy turbulence, (thunderstorm entry) or intentional alteration of pitch or, (to a lesser extent) power, the aircraft should remain in a stable state for a reasonable period of time while the P1 hand-flies the aircraft and calls for the UAS drill, and the P2 brings out the QRH.
Contrary to some of the ill-informed statements made here and in the media by those who have never flown, or who have never flown the A330, this airplane hand-flies beautifully at all flight levels and is not a "hand-full", unless,
like any airplane, it is near/at the boundaries of flight it was designed for and the crew trained for.
The crew could respond to all the messages, once the ECAM had settled down...it doesn't take long, but the professional airline pilots here I'm sure will say that slowing things down a tad (but not dragging it out), and gathering thoughts before launching, is a key to successfull handling of very complex and serious events. One must get one's surprise and rush of adrenaline under control first, then, as a crew, begin.
Even DP Davies advises "lighting up a pipe", (so to speak!), before rushing into drills. He quite markedly states that the only drill which must be done swiftly, accurately, with discipline and deliberation is the rejected takeoff.
However this unfolds on Friday and in the subsequent months, we must bear in mind first, the families whose loved ones died in this accident and set aside any desire to be "first" or "right" with this or that solution to this accident. The presentation of the actual data will not resolve all questions and, as many have already observed, "the crew" are a part of a very complex, dynamic system in which human factors will inevitably play a part.