All 3 probes are currently of similar design and would thus be expected to fail in a similar way worst case, representing an effective single point of failure. Avoidance of single point failure is the first line of defense in any safety critical work, especially relevant in this case when one considers how important the probe info is for safe operation of the aircraft.
Someone correct me if i'm adrift here, but "for want of a nail" seems
quite appropriate w/respect to the probes...
I think this point is worth repeating, in terms of what a redundant system is, and what it isn't. Unless there is something different about each probe, they represent a potential (in terms of being in identical environment) single point of failure in three part harmony.
Given the criticality of the probess function, how different can they be and still provide the input that permits airspeed to be used by both the flight crew and the computers in the flight control system?
I'll ask the Airbus drivers a question that has come up before: would an AoA gage (which is apparently not common in any airliner design, and for most regimes of flight a supplemental scan item) be a useful addition to the flying display?
AoA is already detected and provided to the system for protections and laws. Is there a good reason not to feed AoA to the flight crew? Adding "one more thing" to the display or HUD or instrument panel isn't to be done lightly, given ergonomics and scan development.
Or, is the general consensus something like this:
if you are flying, your charge is to stay ahead of the aircraft far enough to avoid getting into marginal AoA conditions? From the comments in this, and a host of other threads regarding varying mishaps, I get the impression that adding an AoA gage isn't perceived as the way ahead.
*shields up*