gums, #2226
back to my cave, now, as the press is now focusing upon "deep stall" and
such. And my pea-brained background causes me to wonder how a system
that works as advertised can allow ( maybe even cause) the confused
aircrew to wind up in a loss of control accident. I thought all those
control laws and sub-laws, and sub-sub-laws would help just a bit.
Something that's been bothering me for some time as well. I'm really not
concerned what language is used to program the system, or any other software
related issue, as the field is by and large, well proven. What does bother
me is more of a human factors issue. If the whole idea of automation is
to reduce workload and do something predictable under all circumstances,
how is it that the system can max out the crew by too many or ambiguous
warning messages to the point that they have no idea of the state of
the aircraft ?. Speculation ?. Well perhaps, but how did a perfectly
servicable aircraft with a highly competent crew just fall out of the
sky ?.
The other point, again, is the probes. It cannot be beyond the wit of man
to design a probe that doesn't overheat on the ground, yet has enough
capability to melt ice under worse case conditions. Any engineer looking
at this cold would put in one or more temp sensors such as platinum film or
even a simple thermostat, perhaps a 3 term controller and big fat heating
element. No on/off switches or modes needed either, further reducing
workload and possibility of human error.
All 3 probes are currently of similar design and would thus be expected
to fail in a similar way worst case, representing an effective single
point of failure. Avoidance of single point failure is the first line of defense
in any safety critical work, especially relevant in this case when one
considers how important the probe info is for safe operation of the aircraft.
Someone correct me if i'm adrift here, but "for want of a nail" seems
quite appropriate w/respect to the probes...