Roper, I apologise for my mistake. What I should have said was that the three recommendations in the report do not relate to pilot performance but instead concern starter and crankshaft gear repetitive inspections, CVRs and upgrading seats. Furthermore the report points out that the three survivors all thought the thud came from the RH engine and that was where the crew were also looking.
The report concludes that the LH engine continued to produce power for a considerable time after the RH engine was secured and that the aircraft continued to climb. The POH was quoted as advising that level flight could not be maintained with an unfeathered prop on a failed engine so the captain had to feather if he believed the RH engine had failed. The report also concludes that the aircraft was still climbing when the emergency was declared and the intention to return to the field announced.
The report states that the emergency could have started as low as 200ft with the aircraft at max weight. This was a hellish situation for which the report says there is no possibility of training other than in a sim, of which the nearest was in the US.