Sikorsky still refuse to contribute to the Inquiry.
Not a huge surprise since everything comes back to their gearbox design:
It failed the 30 min run dry and their engineers had to find a workaround - ie exploit the extremely remote clause without (or maybe with) considering a filter bowl failure.
The assertion that a total loss of lubricant was extremely remote drove the drills and procedures in the RFM and the training on the aircraft conversion such that the pilots were slow in identifying the actual failure because it was assumed that such a failure couldn't occur and any MRGB malfunction would have an oil temp indication to help diagnose it.
All of the other issues of survivability come down to the severity of the impact and that crashworthiness over water assumes a controlled ditching - not a TR pinion failure at 400 ft - but the main reason they found themselves in that situation was a poorly designed MRGB not fit for purpose.
I hope Sikorsky are hanging their heads in shame over this sad accident - totally preventable if your business ethos is moral and ethical and you don't try to bend the rules to accomodate a flawed product.
As an aside, does anyone think that a rearcrewman might have noticed gearbox oil pouring down the side past the windows and alerted the pilots to the severity of the problem? The absence of a cabin attendant seems to be the norm in offshore ops (down to cost I suppose), but would a properly trained and experienced rearcrew in the cabin have a. helped the stressed front crew and b. been in a position to help the pax escape if he had been on a HUET system?