John,
which is why we try to stay away from situations which might involve an extreme event.
After learning on 38 UAS cases since 2003 we may ask: Are the the present airworthiness system working pro actively (in important issues like this one) like pilots naturally do?
Now, whether this mishap is the result of aircraft deficiencies, crew deficiencies, operational deficiencies, Design Standards deficiencies and so forth .. will come out of the investigation. Aspects of design and procedures may well be varied to plug whatever holes are found to exist in the dyke .. time will tell.
IMHO on this subject there is a "slow moving bureaucracy" affected also by lack of will to invest (and be proactive).
Since the Comet investigation the System still moves only after the losses.
And the UAS cases of a parameter so important indeed strongly recommends to pilots to act pro actively "staying away" like you mentioned.
My point is: Considering the System lags behind (bureaucratically) pilots increasingly operating complex a/c systems must realize the (natural?) limitations of the System.
I worked in a (private) positions report network in the seventies (using TTY, HF rig, etc. ) and after reading the comm. logs of AF447 and analyzing reactions of brazilian, senegalese centers i ask: What was done (or is being made) to fix the
errors that occurred at that night? This relates directly to safety and thatīs the reason of my question.
Mac