A recap of the facts may be appropriate:
What we know,
There were powerful cumulonimbus clusters on the route of AF447. Some
of them could have been the centre of some notable turbulence.
Several airplanes that were flying before and after AF 447, at about the
same altitude, altered their routes in order to avoid cloud masses
Twenty-four automatic maintenance messages were received between
2 h 10 and 2 h 15 via the ACARS system. These messages show an
inconsistency in the measured speeds as well as the associated
consequences.
Twenty-one messages present on the CFR are caused or can be caused by
anemometric problems;
The probes that equipped F-GZCP met requirements that were stricter than
the certification standards
The operator’s and the manufacturer’s procedures mention actions to be
undertaken by the crew when they have doubts as to the accuracy of the
speed indications,
The oxygen masks had not been released; there had been no in-flight
depressurisation,
All of the life jackets that were found were still in their containers,
The airplane’s flaps were retracted at the time of the impact with the water
Three of the eleven cabin crew seats were found; they were not in use at the
time of the impact,
Examination of all of the debris confirmed that the airplane struck the surface
of the water pitch-up, with a slight bank and at a high vertical speed,
I fail to see any relevance to never ending inaccurate irrelevant discussions relating to fbw technology.
Important here is to to find out why AF447 chose not to alter their route.