Cause, contributing cause(s), findings, et al
Salute!
I have to lean with Wolf, Bear and others here.....
- We shall finally see that no single design deficiency or crew action had the end result. As with most losses, it will be a chain of events. Hopefully, we will see procedural changes and mabe some "design" changes implemented to prevent future incidents.
- "design", as Wolf says, has lots more than basic airframe characteristics. The human interface with the "system" is an important component of the "design". To this old dinosaur that flew the first operational FBW system, seems that the 'bus has a convoluted sequence of reversion to basic control laws that are closely coupled to the autopilot and other considerations when things turn to worms. Seems that the crew should be able to use a single switch or button to get to the basic FBW control laws and let the plane do what it is aerodynamically and structurally capable of doing.
- I won't argue with the certification process. The FBW control laws for the 'bus appear to be in synch with the basic "requirements" for certification. This is a point I can wait to discuss over a few beers and "there I was" war stories.
For now, I can say my point is that all the reversion sequences do not seem to be considered in the certification process, and that is what is bugging me. Where's the consideration of reasonable crew actions when things go wrong? It's Wolf's point about "design".
All for now, and hope we get to see some "real" data versus speculation soon.