There seeming is a great deal of desire for instant explanations of what caused the demise of AF447 now that the data has been recovered from the CVR & FDR. IMO, it isn't going to happen if the investigation is done properly by the BEA and the participating contributors. In fact, the next interim report by the BEA, thought to be forthcoming in mid-summer, may be a summary of general observations derived at that time, far from complete and only factual information without any speculation as to cause or where responsibilities may rest. I would be surprised if it turns out differently. To understand the complexity and the time it takes to draw the correct conclusions may be to examine another complex aircraft accident mystery and how the investigation was both organized and carried out to conclusion. I speak of TWA800. Here is the way that investigation and the organized teams were assembled:
NTSB - TWA800 exhibits on the web
Note the various teams and their areas of expertise and the work scope each had to accomplish to report their
factual findings in a written report. For example, the powerplant report (my major area of interest) contains factual information and observations of each engine after recovery, photographing and tear down to inspect the various components. No speculations were made as to engine operating conditions in the report that was issued. Now multiply this by all the various teams working while thinking the time to accomplish. Granted, the teams and makeup will be different in the case of the AF447 investigation.
After this stage comes the step of putting all the reports together and examining one against the others to then begin the process of identifying the complete story as to what actually took place, if possible, in some instances. This leads a public hearing of sorts where the findings are revealed and if there might be any objections by the parties involved that could result in additional studies or investigations. Only after this will the final accident report be developed and issued with known causes and probable causes or unknown causes denoted along with proposed safety recommendations to be instituted, or not, by the responsible authority (EASA?)
There is no instant coffee, it is a process that takes time to get right and there is only one chance to get it right.