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Old 9th May 2011, 18:17
  #1009 (permalink)  
Lonewolf_50
 
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Texas
Age: 60
Posts: 5,374
From the PDF
The end result of two years work is a training package including a video and a CD-ROM, giving an airplane upset recovery training aid.
However, all members of the joint industry group agreed that the package is aimed at preventing loss of control accidents on conventional aircraft. It is not aimed at protected Fly-by-Wire aircraft. There is no need for this type of continuation training on protected aircraft, although a general knowledge of the principles involved is useful for every pilot.
One hopes that this apparent hubris has been mitigated in the interim. (Report is 15 years old, yes?) I say this fully acknowledging that the author is a better pilot than I.
We wanted a general knowledge based approach, as opposed to a rule based one. For this, after proposing some initial actions, we talk about “additional techniques which may be tried”. This obviously is more difficult to teach
The difference between education and training. I applaud the approach advocated.
When we started our discussions, the training being given in the airlines to recover from excessive nose-up pitch attitudes emphasised rolling rapidly towards 90° of bank.
A boilerplate "unusual attitudes" recovery technique.
Based on our experience as test pilots we are very wary of using rudder close to the stall. It is the best way to provoke a loss of control if not used very carefully, particularly with flaps out.
As discussed previously in various AF 447 posts ... and as seen in stall training in small single engine trainers.
JD-EE
If you are going to design an aircraft that gives up control when the automation gets confused but not before then you need the pilots to have the most wide open control possible. Maybe that will be a takeaway from AF-447.
If your suggestion is to be considered, there is likely a cultural (industry and/or corporate) issue that may be non-trivial to address .
Meantime, lobby for a switch on the radar front panel that may involve an "ARE YOU REALLY SURE?" interaction with the pilot that enables full control of the display including any raw mode that could exist. The pilots are being offloaded for other flight controls. So they have time to operate the radar in detail modes; and, they have time to learn how.
I think you mean "for other flight duties" but I see what you are headed towards.

I learned radar work on a scope with more or less raw video (ship board radar) and was disappointed in later graduating to the APS-124, which only providing processed video to my cockpit display in the (then new) SH-60B. One factor that drove this choice was that the data from the radar had to be in a form that would easily go down a directional data link to the ship's Combat Information Center. That tech and design decision allowed the radar to share space in the cockpit with our other tactical displays, via a selection toggle, but it constrained how much one could get out of the radar itself. It also allowed either the pilot, or the crewman, to work the radar.

While I share your position on giving the pilot the choices to tweak the display and input, there is the design problem of competing with other capability for real estate in the finite amount of space provided for pilot attention on any flight deck.

Ergonomics at its most interesting.

Some of the folks who operate that radar have, in various posts over the past two years, pointed out that there is some room to "tweak" the display during a given trip. It may be "good enough" with enough operator training, habit, and familiarity. This points again to a cultural issue, possibly moreso than a design issue.
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